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1. Introduction 
 
Transparency is an important issue in the EU and her member states. In 2014, the European 
Commission and the European Parliament have agreed on new rules regarding the 
Transparency Register on lobbying in the EU. These new rules are operative since January 
2015. The changes that were made with these new rules should make the regulation of 
lobbyists and lobbying practices even more transparent. Even though these new adoptions 
were made, making further regulations, or even legislation, to regulate lobbying is still on the 
agenda of the new Commission. The new Juncker Commission intends to create a proposal in 
2015, that will at least make the register mandatory, so that all lobbyists who want to access 
and meet with officials from at least the European Commission and the European Parliament 
have to be registered.1 That the Commission is creating further legislation on the 
Transparency Register, indicates how important transparency in the EU is right now. 
Lobbying is the act of communicating with decision-makers or advisors to influence their 
decisions. So a lobbyist or an interest group is an individual or organisation that tries to 
influence the decision making process. An interest group can range from corporations, to 
NGO’s and all have different interests.2 Also, private actors, like companies, delegate the 
representation of their interests to professional lobby offices.3 Since the Single European Act 
of 1986, competences started shifting more and more from the member states, to the EU. 
Because of this shift, lobbying in the EU has become more interesting and appealing for 
lobbyists.4 
Even though lobbyists are more and more interested in the EU and studying lobbyists and 
interest groups is very relevant to be able to fully understand the functioning of democracy, 
lobbying has not yet been studied that much in political science. However, the field is getting 
more popular to research, with more emphasis on empirical research techniques.5 
 
                                                          
1 European Commission, Press Release: Commission and Parliament Implement New Rules on Transparency 
Register, retrieved on http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-3740_en.htm on 12-02-2015 
2 I. Bache, S. George, S. Bulmer, Politics in the European Union, New York: Oxford University Press 2011, p. 
331  
3 Irina Michalowitz, 'EU Lobbying - Principals, Agents and Targets: Strategic interest intermediation in EU 
policy-making', Münster: Lit Verlag 2004, p. 18 
4 I. Bache, S. George, S. Bulmer, Politics in the European Union, New York: Oxford University Press 2011, pp. 
331 - 333 
5 Jan Beyers , Rainer Eising & William Maloney, ‘Researching Interest Group Politics in Europe and 
Elsewhere: Much We Study, Little We Know?’, West European Politics, vol. 31:6 2008, pp. 1103-1128 
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In May 2006 the Commission adopted the Green Paper on the European Transparency 
Initiative to regulate the lobby practices in the EU. The initiative was about how the process 
of lobbying is not open enough, and therefore the influence the lobbyists have is not clear 
either. The Commission stated that the lack of transparency was hurtful for the democratic 
legitimacy of the EU, because the citizens don’t feel like they know what’s going on and 
therefore feel like they are no part of the entire thing. This damages the democratic 
legitimacy of the EU. In the Green Paper, a system was proposed in which the lobbyists could 
voluntary register. With registering, the lobbyists have to be open about who they represent, 
who funds their organisation, what their main aim is, etc. The register also contains a 
voluntary code of conduct.6  
But how successful has the voluntary register been in the past? Does the register actually 
make the process of lobbying more transparent? Will the register work better if it is fully 
mandatory or even only partially mandatory? These questions still remain when looking at 
the literature about the Transparency Register. That is why the research question of this thesis 
will be: 
Is the Transparency Register a sufficient method to regulate lobbying in the EU or should the 
EU create further legislation, and if so; what form should the further legislation/regulation 
be? 
First, it is important to determine what Transparency is. Schnackenberg and Tomlinson 
created a definition of transparency by analysing how the word was used in different 
scientific publications. They stated that transparency is about sharing information. Also, the 
information should be shared intentionally and the quality of this shared information is 
important. If a lot is shared, but the quality is bad, it is still not transparent.7 So, transparent 
policymaking is when the information is intentionally shared broadly during the 
policymaking process by the players. The quality of the shared information should be 
sufficient to get a clear view of how the process went. 
To be able to write anything about regulating lobbying in the EU, there should be an 
introduction to lobbying regulations in the first place. This is researched and explained in this 
                                                          
6 Magdalena Godowska, ‘Democratic Dilemmas and the Regulation of Lobbying – the European Transparency 
Initiative and the Register for Lobbyists’, Yearbook of Polish European Studies, nr: 14 2011, pp. 181-200 
7 Andrew K. Schnackenberg & Edward C. Tomlinson, ‘Organizational Transparency: A New Perspective on 
Managing Trust In Organization-Stakeholder Relationship’, Journal of Management, published online on 10 
March 2014, DOI: 10.1177/0149206314525202 , retrieved on 04-11-2014 
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first chapter, as well as the general theory on transparency. The second chapter of this thesis 
is a description of the Transparency Register until now. It is a short historical overview on 
lobbying regulations and an explanation of how the Transparency Register works. To answer 
the research question, the new proposed regulations and the implementation has to be 
explained. This is also in the second chapter. The third chapter starts by explaining the 
methodology that was used in this thesis. The parties that were researched are introduced and 
their opinions on the Transparency Register are explained. The final part of chapter three is a 
description of what the outcome of the research was. The fourth chapter is the concluding 
chapter. The general opinions of the researched parties are discusses. This thesis ends with 
the answer to the research question and there are recommendations made to the European 
Commission. 
General Theory on Lobbying 
As stated before, lobbying has not been studied that much, although the research of lobbying 
is crucial for understanding democracies and politics. A challenge of researching lobbying, is 
that researchers all use different definitions for lobbying or lobbyist.8 The EU has also 
defined lobbying in the Inter Institutional Agreement (IIA) that created the Transparency 
Register. The definition is as followed: “The scope of the register covers all activities carried 
out with the objective of directly influencing the formulation or implementation of policy and 
the decision-making processes of the EU institutions.”9 The EU also describes that it doesn’t 
matter which channel or medium was used to exert this influence.10 Because the regulations 
of the EU are studied in this thesis, this will be the definition that has been used. 
Many people associate lobbying with corruption and secrecy and definitely not with 
transparency and being helpful for policymakers. However, lobbyists play a very important 
role in the policymaking process. Lobbyists provide policy makers with expert knowledge 
and information that government officials don’t have. Lobbyists also hold the government 
                                                          
8 Jan Beyers , Rainer Eising & William Maloney, ‘Researching Interest Group Politics in Europe and 
Elsewhere: Much We Study, Little We Know?’, West European Politics, vol. 31:6 2008, 1103-1128 
9 Official Journal of the European Union, Agreement between the European Parliament and the European 
Commission on the transparency register for organisations and self-employed individuals engaged in EU policy-
making and policy implementation, 3. Scope of the Register, retrieved from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32014Q0919(01)&from=en on 20-04-2015 
10 ibid 
Rebecca Honing                                                                                                                  s1599623 
 
5 
 
accountable by explaining the government’s actions and monitoring them, this helps making 
legislation as effective as possible.11 
Sometimes, lobbyists are even seen as the solution to the democratic deficit it has been 
struggling with. The democratic deficit is an issue the EU is been dealing with for over 30 
years. Since the start of the EU, the participation in the elections of the European Parliament 
has gone down gradually every year. Because of this, the democratic legitimacy of the EU is 
in danger.12 When there is a democratic deficit, there is a lack of democratic control and 
legitimacy by the voting citizens.13 This means that there is a lack of control by citizens in the 
EU and that leads to citizens feeling detached from the EU. According to Kohler-Koch and 
Finke, the EU use lobbyists to compensate for the democratic deficit. According to them, 
lobbyists represent the diffuse opinions of the European population. However, Scientists 
question whether the lobbyists actually represent the opinions of the European citizens, or if 
they just represent the opinion of a small group of citizens. Lobbyists try to achieve their own 
goals or the goals of their clients and they will most likely not always take into account the 
general public opinion.14 It is not necessarily bad that lobbyists represent the smaller group, 
however, it’s wise to take that into account when meeting with lobbyists to use them as 
citizens’ representatives. 
Transparency in the EU 
Not only the definition of lobbying has proven to be very diffuse, the term transparency has 
also been used differently by many scientists. By examining multiple scientific publications, 
professional books and more practical books, Schnackenberg and Tomlinson came with a 
definition of transparency. As explained before in this introduction, transparency is about 
sharing information that has a good quality. The sharing of information should be intentional. 
Transparency is one of the democratic principles of the EU. According to article 11 (2) of the 
Treaty of the European Union (TEU), the institutions have to be open and transparent. That 
transparency is mentioned in the Treaties proves how important transparency is in the EU. 
                                                          
11 OECD, ‘Private Interests, Public Conduct: The Essence of Lobbying’, Lobbyists, Governments and Public 
Trust, Volume 2: Promoting Integrity through Self-regulation, OECD Publishing 2012, p. 27  
12 Lucia Vesnic-Alujevic & Rodrigo Castro Nacarin, ‘The EU and its democratic deficit: 
problems and (possible) solutions’, European View, nr. 11:1 2012, pp. 63-70 
13 Victor Bekkers, Geske Dijkstra, Arthur Edwards and Menno Fenger, ‘Governance and the Democratic Deficit 
Introduction’ in Victor Bekkers, Geske Dijkstra, Arthur Edwards and Menno Fenger, Governance and the 
Democratic Deficit Assessing the Democratic Legitimacy of Governance Practices, Cornwall: Ashgate 
Publishing Company 2007, pp 3 - 11 
14 Beate Kohler-Koch & Barbara Finke, ‘The Institutional Shaping of EU–Society Relations: A Contribution to 
Democracy via Participation?’, Journal of Civil Society, nr. 3:3 2007, pp 205-221 
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However, the EU has been criticised for not being transparent enough and for being too 
technocratic. The EU has also realised this problem. At the Laeken European Council, the 
Laeken Declaration was signed in 2001. This declaration stated, amongst other things, that 
the EU needed to improve and monitor democratic legitimacy and transparency. This 
indicates that the EU understood that something needed to be done and the transparency issue 
needed to be dealt with.15 
Not only the Transparency register was created to make the EU more transparent, there were 
also instruments created that do not focus on lobbying. These instruments should make the 
EU more transparent and should make European legislation easy accessible for all citizens. 
Although the focus of this thesis is the Transparency Register for lobbyists, it is still useful to 
mention these transparency initiatives. Because the thesis focusses on the register, they will 
only be mentioned and explained briefly. The first is the Transparency Portal that was created 
in 2012 by the Commission. The second is a website on Ethics and Transparency, created by 
the European Parliament in 2013.16 The Transparency Portal is a website that gives citizens 
easy and direct access to different information. This makes it easier for citizens to understand 
and follow European affairs. The website contains links to different information. For example 
direct links to legislation, information on who receives EU money and links to different 
registers, like the Comitology Register, a register of internal Commission documents and the 
Transparency Register.17 The Ethics and Transparency website is part of the general website 
of the European Parliament. Like the Transparency Portal, it contains multiple links. There 
are links to the codes of conducts of MEPs and the code of conduct of civil servants and 
employees of the European Parliament. It also links to a register of documents and the 
Transparency Register.18 Transparency is a topic that is being discussed in the EU right now. 
The EU is not only trying to make lobbying processes more transparent, but transparency is a 
topic that the EU is working on in more fields.  
 
                                                          
15 Adam Jan Cygan, Accountability, parliamentarism and transparency in the EU the role of national 
parliaments, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited 2013,  pp. 7 - 14 
16 European Commission, ‘ Why a Transparency Register?’, retrieved from 
http://ec.europa.eu/transparencyregister/public/staticPage/displayStaticPage.do?locale=nl&reference=WHY_TR
ANSPARENCY_REGISTER on 15-02-2015 
17 European Commission, ‘Transparency Portal’, retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/index_nl.htm 
on 15-02-2015 
18 European Parliament, ‘Ethics and transparency’, retrieved from 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/nl/20150201PVL00050/Ethiek-en-transparantie on 15-02-2015 
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2. The Transparency Register 
 
As stated in the introduction, competences started shifting from the member states to the EU 
after the Single European Act (SEA) came into effect in 1987. Representation in the EU 
became more interesting for companies as well as for NGO’s. It is difficult to find exact 
statistics about the amount of lobbyists in the EU, because not all lobbyists are officially 
registered or they are registered under a different registry.19 On 16-02-2015, there were 7792 
individuals and organisations registered in the Transparency Register.20 However, because 
not every lobbyist is registered, it is likely that there are much more lobbyists active in the 
EU. This chapter looks at the Transparency register as it is right now. It first gives a historical 
overview of lobby regulations and how the Transparency Register started off. Then this 
chapter explains how the Transparency Register works and what the weaknesses of the 
Register are, what the proposal of the Commission is and about the legal basis of the 
Transparency Register.  
Historical overview 
The EU was not the first political system that created lobbying regulation. The United States 
(US) has the longest history of regulating lobbying of all other political systems that 
regulated lobbying now. In the US, lobbying has been an important issue since the Civil War. 
In this time, railroad lobbyists were lobbying very aggressively. The US government tried to 
create a lobbying register in 1876, but the attempt failed. Since 1911, Congress spoke about 
regulating lobbying almost every session. However, regulations never came about and the 
regulation of lobbying was unsuccessful. Then, the governments of states started to regulate 
lobbying. In the 1950s, 38 states had created lobbying regulations. The Federal Regulation of 
Lobbying Act of 1946 was the first general law on the regulation of lobbying in the US. 
However, this act didn't cover much of the lobbying aspects. It was about the registration of 
persons who were hired for the purpose of lobbying and creating reports on the financial 
aspects of lobbying. So it only focussed on third party lobbyists, the in-house lobbyists were 
not included in this regulation. This piece of legislation was seen as a failure, because it only 
covered lobbying at Congress, but it still remained until 1995 when it was replaced by the 
Lobbying Disclosure Act. The Lobbying Disclosure Act tightened the rules that were created 
                                                          
19 I. Bache, S. George, S. Bulmer, Politics in the European Union, New York: Oxford University Press 2011, 
pp. 331 - 333 
20 Joint Transparency Register Secretariat, ‘Transparency Register Statistics’, retrieved from: 
http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/docs/reg/new_statistiques_en.pdf on 16-02-2015 
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in the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act. The definition of a lobbyist was now changed to 
include more lobbyists and types of lobbying acts and there were stricter rules on who needed 
to register. Also, the rules on the information the lobbyists have to provide are stricter.21 The 
changes in the regulation made the process more transparent. The European system and the 
American system on regulating lobbying don’t have the same background. Where lobbying 
law in the US has been discussed for a very long time, this is not the case in the EU.22   
In the early ‘90’s, there was still no formal regulation of lobbying for the European 
Commission. However, there were some unofficial rules how Commissioners were supposed 
to behave. In 1993, the Commission published an announcement about the will to create a 
code of conduct and to regulate lobbying. The Commission stated that there was aggressive 
lobbying going on, as well as disturbing behaviour by lobbyists. For example, lobbyists were 
selling official EU documents and got access to institutions of the EU by using access passes 
that were meant for press, not for lobbyists.23  
For the European Parliament, the first rules on lobbying were created in 1996. The Quaestors 
became responsible for issuing the permanent access passes for lobbyists who frequently 
lobbied at the Parliament. The European Parliament elects Quaestors. These selected people 
are responsible for the administrative and financial issues of members of Parliament.24 
According to the Rules of Procedure, rule number 9 of the European Parliament, the 
Quaestors only give these passes to those who sign a register and the code of conduct.25 The 
same rule is now rule 11 of the Rules of Procedure.26 So the European Parliament made a 
mandatory register for lobbyists who wanted to enter the European Parliament building in 
1996. This was the first regulation of lobbying in the EU. The Commission, The Council and 
all other EU institutions did not regulate lobbying yet. When the Council is discussed in this 
thesis, actually the secretariat of the Council is discussed, because the regulation of lobbying 
                                                          
21 Raj Chari, John Hogan and Gary Murphy, Regulating lobbying: A global comparison, Manchester: 
Manchester University Press 2010, pp. 17 - 23 
22 Sebastian Soimu, Adriana Margarit, Daniel Stefan Andrisan, Ionut Stefan, Lobbying in the European Union: 
Practices and Challenges, EIRP Proceedings, Vol 6 2011, pp. 808-815 
23 Official Journal of the European Communities, ‘Increased transparency in the work of the Commission’ 
retrieved from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:C:1993:063:FULL&from=nl on 20-
05-2015 
24 Raj Chari, John Hogan and Gary Murphy, Regulating lobbying: A global comparison, Manchester: 
Manchester University Press 2010, pp. 50-51 
25 Pieter Bouwen, A Theoretical and Empirical Study of Corporate Lobbying in the European Parliament, 
European Integration Online Papers, Vol. 7, Iss. 11 2003, retrieved from http://eiop.or.at/eiop/pdf/2003-011.pdf 
on 23-05-2015 
26 Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament, April 2015, retrieved from 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getLastRules.do?reference=ANN-09&language=EN on 23-05-2015 
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national ministers is done on the national level and EU lobbying regulations don’t count 
there. 
The Commission created the first rules to regulate lobbying in 2001. In the 2001 White 
Paper, the Commission again stated that there was a need for more transparency and 
openness. A voluntary database was created for the civil society organisations. However, 
almost no one signed up because there was no incentive in registering. Even the Commission 
stated that the register had no actual meaning. It was eventually closed.27 After some attempts 
of regulating lobbyists through self-regulatory registers, for example by the Society of 
European Affairs Practitioners (SEAP), the Joint Transparency Register of the European 
Commission and the European Parliament was created by the European Commission and the 
European Parliament in 2011. This register replaced all other self-regulatory registers. While 
the European Parliament already made registering mandatory to get a permanent access pass, 
this register was still voluntary. However, in the Inter-Institutional Agreement (IIA) that 
created the Joint Transparency Register, the will to reflect this voluntary status after a year 
was included.28  
How the Transparency Register works 
As stated in the introduction of this thesis, the Transparency Register is a register with 
voluntary registration for all organisations or individuals that carry out activities to directly or 
indirectly influence the decision making process.29 But why is the register voluntary in the 
first place? The Commission once stated that they wanted to trust the profession of lobbyists 
and that this trust should first be tested, before it was necessary to create binding regulations. 
The creation of more binding legislation was also seen as a problem. The Commission 
explained that they then needed to start the legislative procedure with all institutions. This 
could result in a more narrow definition of lobbyists, because they needed to reach an 
agreement with all institutions. The Commission feared other institutions would want the 
definition to be less broad, so during the negotiations the definition would be watered down. 
A less broad definition would create, in the Commissions own words, “loopholes”. This 
                                                          
27 Raj Chari, John Hogan and Gary Murphy, Regulating lobbying: A global comparison, Manchester: 
Manchester University Press 2010, pp. 55-56 
28 Justin Greenwood & Joanna Dreger, ‘The Transparency Register: A European vanguard of strong lobby 
regulation?’, Interest Groups & Advocacy, nr. 2 2013, pp. 139–162 
29 Official Journal of the European Union, Agreement between the European Parliament and the European 
Commission on the transparency register for organisations and self-employed individuals engaged in EU policy-
making and policy implementation, 3. Scope of the Register, paragraph 7, retrieved from http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32014Q0919(01)&from=en on 20-04-2015 
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roughly means that some lobbyists would fall out of the scope of the regulation, which would 
actually make the playing field more uneven. There was a one-year trial in place for the 
European Commission and European Parliament to test if the voluntary register should be 
made mandatory.30 
Anyone who voluntary decides to registers has to fill in some compulsory information. The 
information are obviously personal and contact information, but also their spending on 
lobbying and their goals in the EU. There is a possibility to add extra information, but 
information about the lobbyists' network or answering questions about their earlier lobbying 
practices is not necessary to complete the registration. When a party sends in their 
information, it is immediately published on the website, without a review by any of the EU 
institutions.31 
This doesn't mean the information in the register is not checked at all. The Commission and 
the Parliament created a Joint Transparency Register Secretariat. They are responsible for 
checking the data, they administer the filed complaints and if necessary, impose sanctions on 
those who registered, but don’t comply with the rules of the register. However, these checks 
are not regular and they don't check every entry. The Secretariat does not have the resources 
to regularly check all the entries.32 Of course, this is a concern. A company could possibly 
enter untruthful information and get access to government officials. Everyone would trust 
them, because they would be able to find them in the register.  
Those who have registered, need to sign and comply with the code of conduct that's attached 
to the register. Part of the code of conduct is, for example, that lobbyists will always identify 
themselves as a lobbyist and that unfair practices or using force to get certain information or 
to be part of the decision making process, is not accepted. If a company has not complied 
with the code of conduct, anyone can file a complaint through the website of the register. The 
Joint Transparency Register Secretariat will look into the complaint and if the code of 
conduct has been breached. If the registrant repeatedly behaved inappropriately or if the 
breach of the code of conduct was very serious, that party could be removed from the registry 
                                                          
30 Raj Chari, John Hogan and Gary Murphy, Regulating lobbying: A global comparison, Manchester: 
Manchester University Press 2010, pp. 56 - 57 
31 Magdalena Godowska, ‘Democratic Dilemmas and the Regulation of Lobbying – the European Transparency 
Initiative and the Register for Lobbyists’, Yearbook of Polish European Studies, nr: 14 2011, pp. 181-200 
32 Magdalena Godowska, ‘Democratic Dilemmas and the Regulation of Lobbying – the European Transparency 
Initiative and the Register for Lobbyists’, Yearbook of Polish European Studies, nr: 14 2011, pp. 181-200 
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for a year or two years. It will also be mentioned in the registry if a party has breached the 
code of conduct in the past.33   
The Secretaries-General of the European Parliament and the European Commission present 
an annual report on the register to tfhe Vice-president of the European Parliament and the 
Vice-President of the European Commission. In the annual report is the factual information 
of the register and there also is a section with the evolution of the register.34 
The weaknesses of the Transparency Register 
This thesis will look at the opinion of professionals who work with the Register, however, 
scientists have also written about the weaknesses of the Transparency Register. The most 
common opinion amongst scientists is that the Transparency Register in this form is not a 
sufficient method to protect transparent and effective policymaking. For example, Godowska 
states that the voluntary aspect of the register is a weakness. Lobbyists have to register for the 
sake of their reputation and as stated before, the register is mandatory for the lobbyists who 
want permanent access to the European Parliament. But because the registry is voluntary, 
there are still lobbyists who don’t register and keep lobbying in backrooms. These lobbyists 
might have something to hide and are the ones for whom the registry was created. So the fact 
that the registry is not binding, is a weakness.35 Of course, the plans of the new Commission 
for mandatory registering to get access to the Commission could change that. However, it 
would still be possible to lobby via unofficial channels. It could be discussed if that is a 
positive or negative aspect of a register as the method to regulate lobbying. 
Godowska also states that business lobbyists, with a lot of corporate funding, are preferred 
over NGO’s by the EU policymakers.36 Persson also states that corporate lobbyists and 
companies are better represented in the EU than other interest groups, at least in the field of 
chemical policy.37 Klüver confirmed Perssons findings. Not only in the field of chemical 
                                                          
33 Official Journal of the European Union, Agreement between the European Parliament and the European 
Commission on the transparency register for organisations and self-employed individuals engaged in EU policy-
making and policy implementation, 7. Measures in the event of non-compliance with the Code of Conduct, 
paragraph 34, retrieved from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32014Q0919(01)&from=en on 20-04-2015 
34 Official Journal of the European Union, Agreement between the European Parliament and the European 
Commission on the transparency register for organisations and self-employed individuals engaged in EU policy-
making and policy implementation, 5. Implementation, paragraph 28, retrieved from http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32014Q0919(01)&from=en on 20-04-2015 
35 Magdalena Godowska, ‘Democratic Dilemmas and the Regulation of Lobbying – the European Transparency 
Initiative and the Register for Lobbyists’, Yearbook of Polish European Studies, nr: 14 2011, pp. 181-200 
36 Ibid 
37 Thomas Persson, ‘Democratizing European Chemicals Policy: Do Consultations Favour Civil Society 
Participation?’, Journal of Civil Society, nr: 3 2007, pp. 223-238  
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policy, Klüver concluded that 66,5% of the 2696 researched lobby groups were lobbying for 
businesses or were part of a corporation.38 However, Klüver also concluded that although the 
companies are the largest lobby group in the EU, this does not automatically translate into 
more success for the companies. Having more resources also does not automatically lead to 
more lobbying success. Therefore, Klüver concluded that there is no systematical bias.39 
 So even though there are different opinions on this issue,  some scientists think there are 
issues with lobbying other than only the transparency issue, however, some issues are linked 
to transparency. Because the Transparency Register only focusses on the transparency aspect 
of lobbying, different types of issues are unaccounted for, like the overrepresentation of 
corporate lobbyists that was just explained.40 The Organisation for Economic Co-Operation 
and Development (OECD) questions the usefulness of the registry. They state, that the 
information that lobbyist have to provide in the registry, is useful for those who asses the 
lobbying process, but they question how much need there is for it. This information is often 
available through other sources and the lobby registry only collects the information in one 
place.41 Also, the register does not include information on the lobbying practices in the EU. 
Therefore, the actual influence certain lobby groups have, is still uncertain.42 Another 
weakness of the register, is the possibility to check the entered information. As stated earlier 
in this chapter, the Secretariat does not have the resources to check all entries.43 Therefore, it 
is not possible to be certain if an entry is truthful or not. The quality of the information in the 
register can’t be guaranteed. 
The new Commission is planning on including more information in the register and already 
more information needs to be included since the alteration in January 2015, as discussed in 
the introduction of this thesis. Since January 2015, more information needs to be disclosed on 
                                                          
38 Heike Klüver, Lobbying in the European Union, Interest groups, Lobbying Coalitions, and Policy Change, 
Oxford University Press: Oxford 2013, p. 214 
39 Heike Klüver, ‘Biasing Politics? Interest Group Participation in EU Policy-Making’, West European Politics, 
vol. 35(5) 2012, pp.1114-1133 
40 Magdalena Godowska, ‘Democratic Dilemmas and the Regulation of Lobbying – the European Transparency 
Initiative and the Register for Lobbyists’, Yearbook of Polish European Studies, nr: 14 2011, pp. 181-200 
41 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development – Public Governance and Territorial Development 
Directorate,  Lobbyists, Governments and Public Trust; Increasing Transparency through Legislation, Volume 
1,  OECD 2009, p. 60 
42 Commission of the European Communities, Green Paper on European Transparency Initiative, op.cit, p. 5–6. 
43 Magdalena Godowska, ‘Democratic Dilemmas and the Regulation of Lobbying – the European Transparency 
Initiative and the Register for Lobbyists’, Yearbook of Polish European Studies, nr: 14 2011, pp. 181-200 
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the exact budget for lobbying and on the lobbying goals of the registered stake holders.44 It 
can be questioned how useful adding more information is.  
Although most scientists don’t think the lobby registry is sufficient to protect democratic and 
transparent lobbying, there are also parties that are positive about the Transparency Register. 
Some scientists think the Transparency Register is a step in the right direction, like 
Greenwood and Dreger. In their article they conclude that, even though the register still has 
some flaws that need to be dealt with, it has brought more openness to EU lobbying and the 
quality of the information in the registry has improved over the years.45 The proposal the 
Commission is working on, could possibly deal with these flaws and further improve the 
quality of information and openness. Also, the Society of European Affairs Professionals 
(SEAP) explained to EUobserver, an independent online news site on the EU, that the SEAP 
actually thinks the voluntary registration is needed and that the registry doesn’t need more 
restrictions, but needs more incentives. An incentive could be, for example, access to the 
negotiation table or speaker time at events for parties that register themselves. 46 
Proposing new Transparency regulations 
The first time the Juncker Commission spoke of transparency, was in the political guidelines 
of the President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker. He wrote that he wants it 
to be open for all citizens to know who the politicians and employees of all institutions are 
meeting with to discuss policy issues. Juncker has expressed the will to create an Inter-
institutional Agreement between the Commission, the Parliament and the Council to make 
the register mandatory for all institutions.47  
As discussed already in this thesis, the first changes in the register have already been made 
and since  January 2015, these changes became active. Lobbyists have to enter more 
information in the register, like a specification of the budget for lobbying and their lobbying 
goals in the EU. This is supposed to make lobbying more transparent already. However, the 
European Commission is still working on a proposal that is planned for 2015, to make the 
                                                          
44 Interinstitutional Agreement L 277/11, Agreement between the European Parliament and the European 
Commission on the transparency register for organisations and self-employed individuals engaged in EU 
policy-making and policy implementation 
45 Justin Greenwood & Joanna Dreger, ‘The Transparency Register: A European vanguard of strong lobby 
regulation?’, Interest Groups & Advocacy, nr. 2 2013, pp. 139–162 
46 SEAP in EUobserver, ‘Transparency Register: keep it voluntary, add incentives’, retrieved from 
http://euobserver.com/stakeholders/123177, on 02-11-2014 
47 Jean-Claude Juncker, A New Start for Europe: My Agenda for Jobs, Growth, Fairness and Democratic 
Change, Political Guidelines for the next European Commission, Opening Statement in the European Parliament 
Plenary Session, Strasbourg, 15 July 2014 
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Transparency Register of lobbyists mandatory for not only the Commission, but also for the 
European Parliament and possibly the Council.  
Two decisions have already been adopted in 2014 that will make the EU more transparent. 
The first is the publication of information on meetings with Commissioners or their 
employees. The second is that the European Commission has decided to only meet with those 
who are in the Transparency Register, like the European Parliament already decided since the 
beginning of the joint regulation of lobbying.48 
Inter-Institutional Agreement 
The Transparency register is based on an Inter-Institutional Agreement (IIA) between the 
European Parliament and the European Commission. Juncker proposed to create a new Inter-
Institutional Agreement to reform lobbying regulations. Inter-Institutional Agreements are an 
agreement between two or more EU institutions. The agreements are fully informal or for the 
most part informal. IIAs are used instead of creating legislation for different reasons. One is 
to fill gaps within the Treaties. Sometimes, an issue is not sufficiently dealt with in the 
treaties, but it is necessary to deal with this issue to be effective. The institutions can then 
choose to fill the gap with an IIA. Another reason is to use IIAs as the first step towards more 
formal legislation.49 However, is an IIA the right legal basis for mandatory regulations on 
lobbying? Because it’s an agreement between the institutions, in the case of the Transparency 
Register these institutions are the European Parliament and the European Commission, these 
institutions are the only ones who are bound to the regulations. Because lobbyists are not 
bound to the register, it is not possible to sanction them when they breach the rules of the 
register or the code of conduct. Does that mean that an IIA is not a fitting legal basis for the 
register? Sven Giegold, a member of European Parliament, addressed this issue and asked 
Frans Timmermans if he would be willing to change the legal basis so that it would be 
possible to sanction lobbyists. To answer this question, Timmermans told him he was a 
pragmatic man. If there was a need for a different legal basis, the Commission would be 
willing to consider that.50  
                                                          
48 European Commission - Press release, ‘Commission and Parliament Implement New Rules on Transparency 
Register’, retrieved from http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-3740_en.htm on 26-05-2015 
49 Michelle Cini, EU Decision-Making on InterInstitutional Agreements: Defining (Common) Rules of Conduct 
for European Lobbyists and Public Servants, West European Politics, vol. 36:6 2013, pp. 1143-1158, DOI: 
10.1080/01402382.2013.826022 
50 Sven Giegold and Frans Timmermans, ´Giegold asks Timmermans about transparency´, retrieved from 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pJzANXxD2Uk on 26-05-2015 
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It has been questioned how the voluntary register could be transformed into a mandatory one 
and it was not clear what the legal basis of a mandatory register would be. Therefore, the lack 
of a legal basis was one of the most used arguments against a mandatory register. Markus 
Krajewski researched the possibility of a legal basis for a mandatory register. He found out 
that it is possible to base the mandatory register on the European Treaties. Krajewski stated 
that article 298 (2) TFEU, combined with the implied powers doctrine, could be the legal 
basis, created through the ordinary legislative procedure. Article 298 (2) gives the European 
institutions the right to create regulations about administrative procedures, if this makes the 
EU more efficient and open. However, article 298 has not yet been used, so there is no 
example of how this would work out yet. The implied powers doctrine gives the EU 
institutions the right to take action, even if there is no legal basis in the treaties.51 This means 
the mandatory register would be possible if the member states or the Council agree with it. 
This proves that a mandatory register could be possible within the legal framework of the EU. 
Regulating lobbying in the member states 
The EU and the US are not the only political systems that have regulated lobbying. Because 
the regulations of the EU don’t cover the systems of the member states, some member states 
created their own system to regulate lobbying. The first member state that regulated lobbying 
was Germany. Germany regulated lobbying even before the EU did. The first discussions on 
the regulation of lobbying emerged in the 70’s. Germany eventually created a public list or 
register, that is partially mandatory. However, there are issues with this register too, while 
Germany chose a very narrow definition of a lobbyist. Because of this, there are too many 
loopholes and the playing field is too uneven.52 
There are more member states that have regulated lobbying in the EU in different ways. 
Transparency International has researched 18 European countries and the EU. The EU and 
European Countries perform relatively poorly in regulating lobbying. None of the countries 
that were studied had a system that really protected transparency. The European Commission 
and Slovenia were the only systems that scored more than 50 percent. Only seven of the 
examined countries have laws or regulations that specifically regulate lobbying. However, 
                                                          
51 Markus Krajewski, ´Legal Framework for a mandatory EU lobby register and regulations´, retrieved from 
http://alter-
eu.org/sites/default/files/documents/1806%20legal%20framework%20for%20mandatory%20EU%20lobby%20r
egister.pdf on 20-06-2015 
52 Raj Chari, John Hogan and Gary Murphy, Regulating lobbying: A global comparison, Manchester: 
Manchester University Press 2010, p. 61 - 63 
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these regulations don’t actually deal with their purpose.53 Although the regulation of lobbying 
in the member states is still not up to par, there is a growing awareness that the regulation of 
lobbying is important and that it’s not working as it is right now. For example in the 
Netherlands, the labour party has proposed an initiative to further regulate lobbying in the 
Dutch political system. They concluded that the system that is created now is insufficient and 
further measures are needed. One of the ideas is to make a Transparency Register that is 
stricter and goes further than their current register. But the plan goes further than only a 
register. They also want to make the agendas of high ranked officials public and they have 
further plans to make the policy making process more transparent.54 So even though the 
member states have the EU as an example, they do not only copy the European model. That 
raises the question if the member states also doubt if the European Transparency Register 
works. Maybe that is the reason that, for example, the Netherlands took a Transparency 
Register as part of their plans and also create measures that go further than only a register.  
What we now know 
So the EU became more interesting for lobbyists over the years, because of the shift of 
powers from the member states to the EU institutions. The EU was not the first system with 
lobbying regulations. The US already wanted to regulate lobbying in 1876, although this 
attempt failed. The first federal regulations on lobbying were created in 1946. However, there 
were still issues with the regulation. In 1995, a new Act, the Lobbying Disclosure Act, 
replaced the first regulations on lobbying. This Act is still in place and the issues with the 
first Act were mostly dealt with.  
The EU has only recently started to regulate lobbying. The European Parliament first started 
regulating lobbying in 1996. It decided to only grant permanent access passes to lobbyists 
who registered and signed a code of conduct. The Commission started with regulations in 
2001. The Commission again stated that the regulation of lobbyists was necessary. Therefore, 
the Commission created a voluntary database that eventually failed and was closed. Finally, 
in 2011, the Joint Transparency of the European Commission and the European Parliament 
was created as an Inter-Institutional Agreement. 
                                                          
53 Transparency International, Lobbying in Europe, Hidden Influence, Privileged access, Report published 15 
April 2015, p. 22. 
54 Lea Bouwmeester, ' Samen voor een transparante lobby', retrieved from 
http://www.pvda.nl/berichten/2015/05/Samen+voor+een+transparante+lobby on 09-06-2015 
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The register is voluntary for all organisations or individuals that carry out activities to directly 
or indirectly influence the decision making process. The register is voluntary because the 
European Commission stated that they first wanted to trust the profession and see if that 
would work out. The Commission also feared that making the register more binding could 
lead to a more narrow definition of a lobbyist. The Commission was afraid that other 
institutions would want a more narrow definition. To reach an agreement with all institutions, 
negotiations on the definition would water it down. This would create loopholes, because 
some lobbyists would have to register while others don’t. The playing field for lobbyists 
become more uneven. 
When registering, certain information needs to be filled out. A code of conduct also has to be 
signed. If anyone thinks the code of conduct has been breached, it is easy to file a complaint 
via an online form. The Joint Transparency Register Secretariat checks the received 
information, checks the incoming complaints and impose sanctions on those who do not 
comply with the code of conduct. However, the Secretariat does not have the resources to 
regularly check all entries, which could be problematic.  
There are scientists that have concerns about the Transparency Register and have found some 
weaknesses to the register. The first is the voluntary aspect. There is no way to monitor the 
lobbyists who choose to not to register. However, these lobbyists are the ones you probably 
want to keep an eye on. Also, the register only deals with mapping the active lobbyists, 
however, other issues, like for example the overrepresentation of corporate lobbyists, are not 
dealt with.  
President of the Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker has expressed the will to further regulate 
lobbying, by making an Inter-Institutional Agreement. However, it is questioned if an IIA is 
the right legal basis for the regulation of lobbying. Because an IIA is only binding for the 
institutions themselves, which make it impossible to sanction anyone who is not part of the 
institutions, like the lobbyists.  
Since the start of the new Commission, changes have been made already. The first became 
active in January 2015. Lobbyists now have to enter more specified information. For 
example, their exact budget on lobbying. Other decisions to make the EU more transparent 
have been made in 2014. The higher Commission officials now only meet with lobbyists who 
are registered and they also publish information about the meetings they had. That now the 
Commission as well as the European Parliament only try to meet with registered lobbyists, is 
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a very big incentive for registering. If a lobbyists wants to have any impact on policy making 
and doesn’t want to register, the Council might now be the only option. This might make the 
register unofficially mandatory. However, it should be taken into account that lobbying in 
more informal settings and unofficial occasions is still possible. A lobbyist does not 
necessarily need an access pass to either the Commission or the European Parliament to be 
able to lobby. 
Interesting issues that were mentioned for the next part of this thesis, are for example the 
question of mandatory versus voluntary. Another issue is the quality of the information in the 
register. Is it actually useful? Finally, the issue of an IIA or legislation will be discussed 
further in this thesis.  
In this chapter, we have seen that there are questions and doubts about the functioning of the 
Transparency Register. But what is the opinion of people who actually work with the 
Transparency Register? This is discussed in the next chapter. 
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3. The opinions of professionals on the Transparency Register 
 
The first part of this thesis has explained the general theory on lobbying and transparency. 
Then, the current transparency register was explained at the opinions of scientists about the 
weaknesses of the current working of the Transparency Register. The next part of this thesis 
is a mapping of the opinions of different actors that are involved with the Transparency 
Register. After all, the ones working with lobbying, lobbyists and the Transparency Register, 
are probably the ones who know what needs to be done to make the lobbying regulations 
more functional. Mapping these opinions should give an insight in the general opinions of 
people and organisations who professionally work and are involved with the Transparency 
Register.  
The method 
The background and opinions of 7 parties will be described and their opinion on the current 
Transparency Register and the future changes in the Transparency Register are discussed. 
The parties have different backgrounds and they are different types of organisations with 
different views and goals. This is to get an overview of opinions of multiple types of 
professionals. Obviously, it is not possible for 7 parties to be representative for every 
professional that is involved with the Transparency Register and therefore, the conclusions of 
this thesis are not the definite truth. However, the results of this thesis are a good indication 
of the general opinion and it could be the start of further research. Also, it should be taken 
into account that the secretive and “bad” lobbyists would probably never publish this 
information, nor would they be willing to openly state that they want to lobby secretively. It 
is therefore probably not possible to map their opinions.  
For every party, there are 3 subjects that will be discussed, either by using documents they’ve 
written themselves, which are written by others, by using the information found on their 
website or by directly asking someone from the organisation.  
1. The description of the organisation and their general opinion on transparency. 
2. Their opinion on the current Transparency Register. 
3. How should further regulations look? Is an IIA the correct legal basis for further 
regulations for lobbying? Should the register be mandatory or voluntary? Should the 
Council be part of the register? 
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ALTER-EU 
 
1. The description of the organisation and their general opinion on transparency. 
ALTER-EU stands for the Alliance for Lobbying Transparency and Ethics Regulation EU. It 
is a coalition of more than 200 different types of groups. The members vary from lobby 
groups and law firms to different NGOs. ALTER-EU are concerned with the influence that 
lobbyists, especially corporate lobbyists, have over politics in Europe. ALTER-EU fears that 
this will lead to less democracy in the EU and that the influence of corporate lobbyists will 
weaken or block the protection of important social and environmental protection reforms.55  
ALTER-EU wants to change this problem by monitoring policy making and using expert 
knowledge to create promotional campaigns. ALTER-EU currently has some active 
campaigns, one of them is called Full lobby transparency now.56  
So ALTER-EU is a coalition that has their primary focus on improving the lobbying situation 
in the EU. It is concerned with the current situation on transparency. 
2. Their opinion on the current Transparency Register. 
ALTER-EU published a report in January 2015 about the Transparency Register, called: 
‘New and Improved? Why the EU Lobby register still fails to deliver.’ As the title already 
suggests, ALTER-EU came to the conclusion the current Transparency Register is still not 
sufficient to really monitor lobbying in the EU. They especially think the voluntary aspect is 
still failing. They argue that some of the main lobby groups still haven’t registered, for 
example big players in the financial world, like Standard & Poors. But also law firms or big 
corporations are not registering. Also, ALTER-EU concluded that the information in the 
register was unreliable, for example lobbyists were not being honest about their identity when 
they registered. Also, the budgets and number of lobbyists that the entries stated they had for 
lobbying, were not realistic. For example, Google has more access passes to the European 
Parliament than the number of lobbyists they registered. As explained in the chapter before 
this, the Register Secretariat should be checking this information, but ALTER-EU thinks that 
they don’t check well enough. They expected the changes made to the register to not have a 
huge impact. Even though more information needs to be entered now, this data will not be 
more accurately. If anything, the Secretariat will have an even heavier workload. According 
                                                          
55 Alter-EU, ‘Who we are’, retrieved from http://alter-eu.org/who-we-are on 28-05-2015 
56 Alter-EU, ‘What we do’, retrieved from http://alter-eu.org/what-we-do on 28-05-2015 
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to ALTER-EU, even though the will to create stricter lobby rules has been expressed a lot, 
too little has actually happened.57 
After the release of this report, ALTER-EU looked at the same data of the report again in 
May 2015. Although some parties that were mentioned in the previous report now registered, 
not all did. Also, because the register changed in January 2015 and more information needed 
to be included in the entries, most parties have updated information in the register. But not 
all, some filled in outdated data, dating back to 2003. So even though some positive changes 
were made, ALTER-EU still thinks the register needs to change for it to work.58   
3. How should further regulations look? Is an IIA the correct legal basis for further 
regulations for lobbying? Should the register be mandatory or voluntary? Should the 
Council be part of the register?  
ALTER-EU states that it is misleading by Juncker to propose an IIA. As explained before, an 
IIA is not binding for lobbyists, because it is only binding for the institutions that made the 
agreement. If the new regulation would still be an IIA, it would not be possible to effectively 
sanction lobbyists who have breached the rules of the Register. Therefore, ALTER-EU thinks 
an IIA is not the correct legal basis for the Transparency Register.59 
Then what should further regulations on lobbying look like? ALTER-EU thinks the 
Commission should propose EU legislation, that would make a mandatory register that is 
legally binding. If the register is legally binding and mandatory, the Secretariat can correctly 
investigate the entries and sanction those that not comply with the rules of the Register.60 
ALTER-EU sent a letter to Vice-President of the Commission, Frans Timmermans, with their 
recommendations for further regulating lobbying in the EU. The letter was signed by more 
than 100 NGOs and trade unions from all over Europe. The letter stated the urgency of 
changing the regulations on lobbying.61 In the letter, three recommendations were made. The 
                                                          
57 Rachel Tansey & Vicky Cann, ‘New and Improved? Why the EU Lobby register still fails to deliver’, 
Published by the Alliance for Lobbying Transparency and Ethics Regulation in the European Union (ALTER-
EU) 2015, pp. 6 - 10 
58 ALTER-EU, ‘How “new and improved” is the EU's lobby register? 27 May 2015’ retrieved from http://alter-
eu.org/sites/default/files/documents/Updated%20new%20and%20improved%20report%2027.5.2015.pdf on 28-
05-2015 
59 ALTER-EU, ‘How “new and improved” is the EU's lobby register? 27 May 2015’ retrieved from http://alter-
eu.org/sites/default/files/documents/Updated%20new%20and%20improved%20report%2027.5.2015.pdf on 28-
05-2015 
60 Ibid 
61 ALTER-EU, ‘Over 100 NGOs urge EU Commission to make the lobby register legally binding’, retrieved 
from http://alter-eu.org/press-releases/2015/05/11/100-ngos-demand-legally-binding-lobby-register on 28-05-
2015 
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first was to make the register mandatory. Lobbyists who try to avoid transparency can still do 
so without any consequence. This is something ALTER-EU is very worried about. Secondly, 
ALTER-EU thinks the information in the register is not sufficient to be able to monitor 
lobbying. They would recommend including information about who the lobbyist is, how 
much influence they have and more specific information on which dossier they lobby. The 
final recommendation is to give the register the means to monitor all entries and to create the 
possibility to sanction lobbyists.62 
Corporate Europe Observatory 
 
1. The description of the organisation and their general opinion on transparency. 
Corporate Europe Observatory (CEO) is an activist research group that has its main focus on 
exposing corporations’ unethical behaviour. CEO also wants to expose the bias policymakers 
have towards corporations and how corporations have, also because of the policymakers’ 
bias, privileged access and influence. CEO is a research group as well as a campaign group 
that is based in Brussels, but is registered as a Dutch NGO. They monitor corporations 
especially, because it is their opinion that their great influence on policymaking leads to 
socially undesirable policy, which leads to big global problems, like environmental problems 
and social injustice.63 
CEO is part of the umbrella of ALTER-EU64, so one can assume their opinion on 
transparency is not so different from ALTER-EU. However, because Corporate Europe 
Observatory is a research group that specifically focusses on transparency and the influence 
of corporate lobbyists in the EU, it is still worth discussing. 
2. Their opinion on the current Transparency Register. 
Like ALTER-EU, CEO also thinks the Transparency Register in this form is not a great 
success and has some issues with the working of the Register. They stated that lobbyists don’t 
take the register seriously and that they therefore don’t bother registering. CEO recognizes 
                                                          
62 ALTER-EU, ‘Letter to first Vice-President of the Commission Frans Timmermans, retrieved from http://alter-
eu.org/sites/default/files/documents/ALTER-EU%20Timmermans%20NGO%20letter%2011.5.15_0.pdf on 28-
05-2015 
63 Corporate Europe Observatory, ‘About CEO, retrieved from http://corporateeurope.org/about-ceo on 28-05-
2015 
64 Koen Rovers & Ester Arauzo, ‘Another year without real transparency, blog written for Corporate Europe 
Observatory, retrieved from http://corporateeurope.org/blog/another-year-without-real-transparency on 28-05-
2015 
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the same issues with the current Transparency Register as ALTER-EU does. The voluntary 
aspect of the register and the incorrect data in the register are seen as reasons why the register 
is not functioning the way it’s supposed to and that it is not a good tool to monitor lobbying 
in the EU.65 
3. How should further regulations look? Is an IIA the correct legal basis for further 
regulations for lobbying? 
CEO has written further recommendations to the Commission for further regulating lobbying. 
First of all, the register should be mandatory and legally binding. The legal basis should be 
EU legislation, so CEO also agrees with ALTER-EU that the IIA is not the correct legal basis 
for the Register. As ALTER-EU, CEO mentions that it is important to be able to sanction 
lobbyists and this is not possible with an IIA as the legal basis.66 As mentioned before, 
because CEO is part of ALTER-EU, they use a lot of ALTER-EU sources and their opinion 
on the Transparency Register is similar to ALTER-EU’s views on lobbying. 
The European Public Affairs Consultancies Association 
 
1. The description of the organisation and their general opinion on transparency. 
The European Public Affairs Consultancies Association (EPACA) is one of the representative  
bodies for public affairs professionals that lobby the EU institutions. They work towards the 
best working climate for their members. EPACA has its own code of conduct and self-regulates 
their members. EPACA states that their code of conduct takes it further than the Register code, 
mainly because the code is applicable to contact with all stakeholders, not only to the contact 
with the EU institutions. EPACA promotes ethical behaviour for all stakeholders and they also 
promote transparency and more specifically transparent lobbying. For reaching these goals, 
EPACA works together with the EU institutions on issues like lobbying and transparency.67 
The code of conduct has 12 points that ensure that the members of EPACA act in complete 
                                                          
65 Koen Rovers & Ester Arauzo, ‘Another year without real transparency, blog written for Corporate Europe 
Observatory, retrieved from http://corporateeurope.org/blog/another-year-without-real-transparency on 28-05-
2015 
66 Corporate Europe Observatory, ‘CEO statement on new transparency initiative of the European Commission’, 
retrieved from http://corporateeurope.org/power-lobbies/2014/11/ceo-statement-new-transparency-initiative-
european-commission on 28-05-2015 
67 EPACA, ‘About EPACA’, retrieved from http://www.epaca.org/about-epaca/about-epaca-2 on 30-05-2015 
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transparency.68 EPACA sees transparency as the fundament of working in the lobbying 
industry with integrity, so improving transparency is extremely important for EPACA.69 
 
2. Their opinion on the current Transparency Register. 
Because EPACA is a supporter of transparency, they support the Transparency Register and 
the effort to regulate lobbying. According to Karl Isaksson, chairman  of EPACA, EPACA 
has been actively involved in the negotiations with the Commission about the register and 
they are already invited by the Commission to be part of the negotiations in the summer of 
2015. EPACA feels like the voluntary aspect of the Transparency Register makes the playing 
field more uneven, because some lobbyists do register, while others don’t and they don’t play 
by the same rules. That’s why EPACA very much supports the decision of the Commission 
that it’s no longer possible to meet with higher ranked people from the Commission for 
lobbyists who are not in the register. They see that this has been a huge incentive to register, 
because ever since, the number of registrants has grown significantly. EPACA does have 
some issues with the additional information that needs to be disclosed in the register. Since 
January, the exact costs spent on lobbying needs to be added in the register. However, this is 
a problem for a lot of  professional lobbyists, while lobbying for them is not a costs, but a 
benefit. Therefore, they just have to disclose all the costs they have, including for example 
employee costs. Also included in the register, is the income of the registrant. However, 
anyone who knows this information, could find out very sensitive information about the 
company, like how much their exact profit is. According to EPACA, this information will not 
improve transparency in the EU as much as it will damage the company and distort the 
internal market. Also, even though EPACA is a supporter of strictly enforcing the rules of the 
register, there is a problem with the enforcement of these rules. According to EPACA, only a 
very small amount of resources go to the register and few people from the Commission and 
Parliament are involved with the Transparency Register. The process of checking the 
complaints to the secretariat are not done correctly and the process is not unambiguous 
enough.70 
                                                          
68 EPACA, ‘EPACA Code of Conduct, retrieved from http://www.epaca.org/code-of-conduct/text-of-code on 
30-05-2015 
69 EPACA, ‘EPACA’s position on the European Transparency Initiative: Make Lobbying a Regulated 
Profession’, 28 June 2011 
70 Karl Isaksson, Chairman of EPACA, Interview over the phone on 08-06-2015 
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3. How should further regulations look? Is an IIA the correct legal basis for further 
regulations for lobbying? Should the register be mandatory or voluntary? Should the 
Council be part of the register? 
As explained before, EPACA wants the register to be mandatory to level the playing field. 
This could be done both by creating legislation, or by making it mandatory in an IIA, like the 
Commission already stated they were planning on. EPACA would rather like it to be 
legislation, but they don’t see that happening anytime soon. They would like the Council to 
be part of the legislation or regulation, but they don’t think it will make a big difference. 
They think including the Council, like stated before in this thesis, only means including the 
Council administration and that that is not really where the lobbying is happening. The real 
lobbying of the Council, is done on the member state level. So even though EPACA wants 
there to be legislation and would like the Council to be included, they don’t think this will 
happen soon and that including them will not have the biggest impact.71  
EPACA thinks the processes of sanctioning and complaints need to be improved. For a 
lobbyists, it is very harmful and bad for their reputation when they get deleted from the 
register, so these actions have a lot of impact. Therefore, every rule has to be very clear, and 
there should be no room for interpretation with these rules. It should be clear who has to 
register and it should be as easy as possible for those who register to comply with the rules. 
As explained in the previous section, EPACA believes the process of complaining is not solid 
enough now. There should be created more clear rules on how this works and when and why 
someone can be expelled. Linked to this, is the problem with the resources. EPACA wants 
the Commission and the Parliament to put more resources into the register to be able to really 
police the rules. This means the Commission and the Parliament need to commit to the 
Transparency Register more. EPACA also thinks that the commitment of the Commission 
and the Parliament to not meet with lobbyists should be stricter. Not only the higher ranked 
officials should only meet with the registered parties, no one who works for the Commission 
or Parliament should do so.72 
Finally, as explained before, EPACA does not agree with everything that registrants need to 
enclose before being able to register. They would like the information in the register to be 
extensive but functional to make the process more transparent. More information is not only 
                                                          
71 Karl Isaksson, Chairman of EPACA, Interview over the phone on 08-06-2015 
72 Karl Isaksson, Chairman of EPACA, Interview over the phone on 08-06-2015 
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not necessary for transparency, but could even distort competition in the lobbying and public 
affairs sector.73 
VNO-NCW 
 
1. The description of the organisation and their general opinion on transparency. 
VNO-NCW is the biggest employers association of the Netherlands. They lobby for the best 
possible climate for investments and companies and VNO-NCW represents Dutch 
businesses.74 The office in Brussels represent the Dutch business by having contact with the 
European Institutions and by working together with different stakeholders, like employers’ 
associations from all over Europe. They lobby on different cases that are relevant for the 
Dutch business climate. In Brussels, VNO-NCW works with different associations and they 
are part of BUSINESSEUROPE, a business association active in Brussels. Also, VNO-NCW 
has four seats in the European Economic and Social Committee.75 
In the Netherlands, the debate on regulating lobbying recently started again. VNO-NCW 
stated that they agree with taking further steps in making Dutch policy making more 
transparent. VNO-NCW stated that they see the importance of transparency for lobbyists and 
that they would agree to improving this.76 
2. Their opinion on the current Transparency Register. 
VNO-NCW is positive about the concept of transparency and the Transparency Register. 
However, they see an important problem in the current Transparency Register. The 
Commission now asks for the exact budget for lobbying of companies that register. However, 
this can be very difficult to calculate and specify, because some companies hire a certain 
company to do multiple activities, including lobbying. This makes it difficult to precisely 
know how much money there is actually spent on lobbying and companies are unable to 
provide the right information. Also, competition could trace back the budget that has been 
entered in the register. This could give the competition insight in sensitive information about 
                                                          
73 Karl Isaksson, Chairman of EPACA, Interview over the phone on 08-06-2015 
74 VNO-NCW, ‘Over VNO-NCW’, retrieved from http://www.vno-
ncw.nl/over_vnoncw/Pages/default.aspx#.VWnDzs_tmko on 30-05-2015 
75 VNO-NCW, ‘Kantoor Brussel’, retrieved from http://www.vno-
ncw.nl/over_vnoncw/KantoorBrussel/Pages/default.aspx#.VWnGzs_tmko on 30-05-2015 
76 Sigrid Verweij; Communication director VNO-NCW, ‘PvdA-voorstel 'Lobby in daglicht' goed voor 
draagvlak’, retrieved from http://www.vno-
ncw.nl/column/Pages/PvdAvoorstel_Lobby_in_daglicht_goed_voor_draagvlak_214.aspx?source=%2fcolumn%
2fPages%2fdefault.aspx#.VWnDqc_tmko on 30-05-2015 
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the other company. This could distort competition within the EU and the information in the 
register could therefore be not compliant with competition laws. EPACA has mentioned a 
very similar issue.77  
3. How should further regulations look? Is an IIA the correct legal basis for further 
regulations for lobbying? Should the register be mandatory or voluntary? Should the 
Council be part of the register? 
So even though VNO-NCW represents companies and industry, they still see eye to eye with 
transparency. However, they do see some issues with the current Transparency Register. 
They expect that these issues will be dealt at, because the system of the Transparency 
Register is still developing. So VNO-NCW supports the Transparency Register, but the 
administrative burden has to be as little as possible for the parties that need to register. It is 
important that the confidential information that companies have to disclose when registering 
is really confidential, because the Register could otherwise intervene with the internal market 
and free competition within the EU. The best case scenario would be to create one system for 
all EU institutions, because it would limit the administrative burden if there is one system for 
all institutions. If there is just one register and one system of regulating lobbying, one 
registration is enough for all institutions. VNO-NCW is not specifically against having a 
mandatory register. They don’t necessarily want or need it to be mandatory, but they don’t 
mind if it is, provided that the register is stable, it’s requirements are reasonable and that the 
register is actually functional.78 
The European Ombudsman 
 
1. The description of the organisation and their general opinion on transparency. 
Since the Maastricht Treaty, the European Union has her own Ombudsman. European 
citizens, legal persons or citizens from third countries can complain to the Ombudsman about 
wrong activities of the institutions. The ombudsman can also start their own investigation out 
of her own initiative. When the investigation is completed, the Ombudsman sends a report to 
the European Parliament and to the institution that was investigated. The one who 
complained will also be updated about the outcome of the investigations. The Ombudsman 
                                                          
77 Winand Quaedvlieg, Permanent Delegate at the VNO-NCW Brussels office, question answered via email on 
02-06-2015 
78 Winand Quaedvlieg, Permanent Delegate at the VNO-NCW Brussels office, question answered via email on 
02-06-2015 
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will make recommendations in this report on how to deal with issues she came across.79 The 
current Ombudsman, Emily O’Reilly, also accepted a code of conduct. In this code of 
conduct, transparency and ethical conduct are seen as key standards for the European 
Ombudsman. The Ombudsman believes that the European institutions can only win back the 
trust of the European citizens, by being transparent and working by high ethical standards. 
The Ombudsman has committed herself to work by the same standards.80 However, 
complains about transparency are one of the most common complains to the Ombudsman. 
20% to 30% of the complaints investigated by the Ombudsman are about issues with 
transparency in the EU.81 
2. Their opinion on the current Transparency Register. 
The Ombudsman thinks the Transparency Register is vital. However, it does not give the full 
picture of the lobbying that takes place in the EU. Many lobbyists still don’t register, and 
according to the Ombudsman, the parties that have permanent access passes to the 
Parliament, are not necessarily the parties that have the most influence. The biggest 
influencers can also be the lobbyists that don’t come near the actual buildings of the 
institutions.82 
The Ombudsman regularly receives complaints on the Transparency Register. The 
complaints are mainly about inaccurate information in the Register. This is another problem 
with the Transparency Register the Ombudsman has identified.83 
3. How should further regulations look? Is an IIA the correct legal basis for further 
regulations for lobbying? Should the register be mandatory or voluntary? Should the 
Council be part of the register? 
The Ombudsman is involved in transforming the Transparency Register. The Ombudsman 
supports the European Commission in making the register mandatory. She also agrees with 
                                                          
79 Paul Craig and Gráinne de Burca, EU Law, Text, Cases and Materials, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2011, 
p. 56 
80 The European Ombudsman, ‘Ethics and Conduct’, retrieved from 
http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/resources/ethics_and_conduct/home.faces on 01-06-2015 
81 The European Ombudsman, Annual Report 2014, p. 7 
82 The European Ombudsman, ‘Is Brussels the new Washington, D.C.? Lobbying transparency in the EU - 
European Ombudsman Opening Address’, retrieved from 
http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/nl/activities/speech.faces/en/59826/html.bookmark on 01-06-2015 
83 The European Ombudsman, ‘Ombudsman calls on Member States to back EU Transparency Register’ 
retrieved from http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/press/release.faces/en/54096/html.bookmark on 01-06-
2015 
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the decision of the Commission to no longer meet with non-registered lobbyists.84 The 
Ombudsman states that the current Transparency Register does not function the way it’s 
supposed to be. The register has to be given “teeth”. To be more effective, the European 
Council should also be included in the Transparency Register. According to O’Reilly, these 
steps could be taken right now,  even without creating new legislation.85  
But these changes are not enough. The register should eventually be in the law and it should 
not just be an IIA. So the European Ombudsman is also a supporter of making legislation of 
the Transparency Register.86 Also, the monitoring of the data that’s been entered in the 
register has to be improved.87 
Transparency International 
 
1. The description of the organisation and their general opinion on transparency. 
Transparency International was created in 1993 as a measure to stand up against corruption. 
Their vision is to create a world where everyone is free of corruption. Transparency 
International is active in more than a 100 countries now. They fight against corruption by 
raising awareness on these issues.88 Transparency International has also made it their mission 
to promote transparency and integrity. Transparency is one of their core values, together with 
other morals, like democracy and justice.89 
2. Their opinion on the current Transparency Register. 
Recently, Transparency International published a report on Transparency in Europe. In this 
report, regulations on lobbying transparency are discussed. Transparency International sees a 
lot of weaknesses in the system as it is right now. The first discussed in the report is the 
voluntary aspect of the register and therefore the fact that some lobbyists are still not 
registered. The second weakness is the weak monitoring of the register and that the 
                                                          
84 The European Ombudsman, Annual Report 2014, p. 10 
85 The European Ombudsman, ‘Ombudsman calls on Member States to back EU Transparency Register’ 
retrieved from http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/press/release.faces/en/54096/html.bookmark on 02-06-
2015 
86 The European Ombudsman, Annual Report 2014, p. 10 
87 The European Ombudsman, ‘Ombudsman calls on Member States to back EU Transparency Register’ 
retrieved from http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/press/release.faces/en/54096/html.bookmark on 02-06-
2015 
88 Transparency International, Our Organisation, retrieved from 
https://www.transparency.org/whoweare/organisation on 02-06-2015 
89 Transparency International, ‘Mission, Vision and Values’, retrieved from 
https://www.transparency.org/whoweare/organisation/mission_vision_and_values/0/ on 02-06-2015 
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Secretariat is not an independent body. The weak monitoring of the Secretariat is even more a 
problem because for the register to work properly, effective sanctioning should be possible. 
Another weakness of the register is that the Council is not part of the register.90  
Although Transparency International sees a lot of negative aspects of the current register, 
they also see a positive feature. Transparency International thinks the definition of lobbyists 
that the EU chose in the scope of the Transparency Register is broad. They agree with this 
choice.91  
3. How should further regulations look? Is an IIA the correct legal basis for further 
regulations for lobbying? Should the register be mandatory or voluntary? Should the 
Council be part of the register? 
Although Transparency International states that the proposal of the Commission to make an 
IIA with the Council and the Parliament will strengthen the system, it is not good enough. A 
mandatory register, created by the legislative procedure, would be a better option. So 
Transparency International does not think an IIA is the right legal basis for the regulation of 
lobbying.92 The register should also be extended to the Council, so that lobbying to the 
Council without registering is not as easy as it is right now. Finally, Transparency 
International recommends ensuring the possibility to sanction lobbyists in cases of 
misconduct.93 This could be possible with a more independent and better functioning 
Secretariat.94 
Society of European Affairs Professionals 
 
1. The description of the organisation and their general opinion on transparency. 
The Society of European Affairs Professionals (SEAP) is, like EPACA, an association that 
represents public affairs professionals in the EU. They not only represent professional 
lobbyists, but also in-house lobbyists of companies, trade associations or other representative 
                                                          
90 Transparency International, Lobbying in Europe, Hidden Influence, Privileged access, Report published 15 
April 2015, pp. 54 - 55 
91 Transparency International, Lobbying in Europe, Hidden Influence, Privileged access, Report published 15 
April 2015, pp. 54 - 55 
92 Transparency International, Lobbying in Europe, Hidden Influence, Privileged access, Report published 15 
April 2015, p. 54 
93 Transparency International, Lobbying in Europe, Hidden Influence, Privileged access, Report published 15 
April 2015, p. 61 
94 Transparency International, Lobbying in Europe, Hidden Influence, Privileged access, Report published 15 
April 2015, p. 54 
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bodies. SEAP is a supporter of high professionalism for the working field. SEAP therefore 
also created a binding code of conduct for their members. They state that their code is a good 
tool to regulate public affairs professionals.95 
Transparency is one of the core values of SEAP. According to article 2 of their code of 
conduct, their members maintain the highest transparency and they will always be open about 
who they are and who they work for. Their members have committed themselves to never 
misrepresent themselves or behave badly in any way.96 
2. Their opinion on the current Transparency Register. 
SEAP supported the effort of the European Parliament and the European Commission when 
they were first planning on enhancing transparency between the institutions and the 
lobbyists.97 SEAP sees some weaknesses in the register. They see a need for harmonisation in 
the regulation of lobbyists between the institutions and between the EU and the member 
states. The problem with no harmonisation is that it creates difficulties for lobbyists to 
comply with several different systems.98  
As explained in earlier chapters, While most of the parties that were researched in this thesis 
think the register should be mandatory, SEAP actually thinks the register should be 
voluntary. They think that registering should be a choice for the lobbyists, for it to be 
transparent. They think coercing the lobbyists is not the right way to go about it. However, 
they do think that registering should be incentivized. That’s why they were supportive of the 
decision of the Commission and Parliament to at least ask the lobbyists why and if they were 
registered. They also recommended them to pass on the information why certain parties 
weren’t registered to each other and to the Register Secretariat, so these issues can be taken 
into account and eventually be dealt with in the future.99 
3. How should further regulations look? Is an IIA the correct legal basis for further 
regulations for lobbying? Should the register be mandatory or voluntary? Should the 
Council be part of the register? 
                                                          
95 SEAP, ‘What is SEAP’, retrieved from http://www.seap.be/ on 10-06-2015 
96 SEAP, Code of Conduct, Article 2 
97 Susanna Di Feliciantonio, President of SEAP, ‘SEAP support for the Transparency Register’, letter to Gérard 
Legris Coordinator, JTRS Head of Unit of 14-02-2013 
98 SEAP, Position on the review of the Joint Transparency Register October 2013 
99 SEAP Press Release, ‘SEAP partially welcomes EP transparency register report’, 15 April 2014 
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To deal with the harmonisation problem that SEAP has identified, SEAP thinks the first step 
is to make the Council a part of the register. SEAP does not elaborate on the question if it’s 
necessary to create legislation, but at least the Council should be a part of the Transparency 
Register. The register should remain a voluntary register, however, registering should be even 
more incentivized than it is right now, for example by not inviting unregistered parties, or to 
only attend conferences or meetings that are organised by parties that are registered. Also, 
ethical behaviour should be supported. Even though SEAP believes in promoting 
transparency through the register code, they state there is a difference between transparency 
and ethical behaviour. The goal of the Transparency Register is obviously is transparency, the 
goal of the code of conduct of SEAP is behaving ethically and transparency is only a part of 
that. The SEAP code goes, as they describe, beyond the Transparency Register Code. SEAP 
thinks it is not the role of the EU to control lobbyists’ behaviour, but the lobbyists should do 
so themselves by self-regulation.100 However, the register should support these code holders 
more, for example by creating a check box in the Transparency Register about other registers, 
like if they have joined one of the organisations with a code of behaviour, like SEAPs code of 
conduct.101 
Politicians in the European Parliament 
As discusses in earlier chapters of this thesis, the European Parliament saw the need for the 
regulation of lobbying in an earlier stage than other institutions. The European Parliament 
was the first institution, that was not willing to grant unregistered lobbyists permanent access 
passes. In 2014, the European Parliament voted on amending the Transparency Register so 
that it is more functional and stricter. Certain decisions on for example sanctioning were dealt 
with in these amendments. Amending the Transparency Register was proposed by the 
European Commission and eventually led to the changes that came into force in January 
2015.102 The discussion in Parliament and the way that certain parties voted on these 
amendments, give a good indication of the opinion of the politicians in the European 
Parliament and how much they are in favour of strengthening the Transparency Register.  
The discussion in the European Parliament started after a rapport by Roberto Gualtieri, who 
was a rapporteur on this issue. In the discussions, it soon became clear that most of the 
                                                          
100 SEAP Press Release, ‘SEAP challenges call to change EU transparency register code of conduct’, 29 April 
2013 
101 SEAP, Position on the review of the Joint Transparency Register October 2013 
102 European Parliament Legislative Observatory, 2014/2010(ACI) - 16/04/2014 Final act, retrieved from 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/summary.do?id=1358860&t=f&l=en on 10-06-2015 
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politicians would agree with the most important parts of the rapport he wrote and that 
politicians from different parties for the most part agreed with each other. For example, 
György Schöpflin, who spoke on behalf of the PPE Group, stated that he mostly agreed with 
the rapport. He said lobbyists and politicians have a tense relationship, while they need each 
other to be able to properly do their jobs, but they also work against each other. To deal with 
the difficulties of lobbying, Schöpflin stated that the framework needed to be further clarified 
and the right legal basis is necessary. Evelyn Regner, from S&D, saw the immediate 
necessity to make the transparency register mandatory. She, like ALTER-EU did, mentioned 
that a big part of financial lobbyists had not registered. The Council should also be part of the 
register, according to Regner. More politicians in the European Parliament had similar 
opinions to this and concluding multiple statements by the politicians, made it very clear that 
the general opinion of the European Parliament was positive towards stricter and mandatory 
lobbying legislation. Overall, they saw the necessity of creating stricter lobbying 
regulations.103 After the discussion, it was no surprise that the decision to amend the 
Transparency Register was adopted. The votes were almost all for the proposal. There were 
646 votes for, only 7 against and 14 abstentions.104 This proves that there is a political will, at 
least in the European Parliament, to deal with this transparency issues and issues with 
lobbyists. 
The committee of the European Parliament also made some amendments to the proposal of 
the Commission. First, they wanted to include that the Parliament regrets that the proposal of 
the Commission still does not deal with the big issues with the Transparency Register, like 
the need to make the register mandatory and that law firms don’t register. Especially the fact 
that the proposal still doesn’t lead to a mandatory register is emphasised in the European 
Parliament’s amendments. Also, the European Parliament urged that the next time the 
Transparency Register is reviewed, a public consultation should be part of this evaluation.105  
                                                          
103 European Parliament debate, Monday 14 April 2014, Strasbourg, Discussion on the Interinstitutional 
agreement on the transparency register (debate), retrieved from 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//TEXT+CRE+20140414+ITEMS+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN#creitem20 on 10-06-2015 
104 European Parliament Legislative Observatory Statistics - 2014/2010(ACI)  |  A7-0258/2014, Results of vote 
in Parliament, retrieved from http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/sda.do?id=24498&l=en on 10-06-2015 
105 Committee on Constitutional Affairs of the European Parliament, Amendments 1 – 50 on the modification of 
the interinstitutional agreement on the Transparency Register, (PE528.034v01-00), retrieved from 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+COMPARL+PE-
529.859+01+DOC+PDF+V0//EN&language=EN on 30-06-2015 
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Some parties have spoken out about stricter rules for a longer time. For example the Greens 
think that the oversight of lobbying is essential. However, they do see some issues with the 
current Transparency Register. First of all, a weakness of the register is that it is voluntary 
and not mandatory. The Greens state that some of the most important players are missing 
from the register, like ALTER-EU also claimed, the Greens mention the missing biggest 
players in the financial industry.106 The Greens have been in favour of a mandatory register 
since the beginning and want every lobbyist to be in the register. In their opinion, the register 
should also include the Council, because if the Council remains to exclude themselves from 
lobbying regulations, lobbying will never be transparent. The Greens request the Commission 
to create a legislative proposal to make the register mandatory, before 2016.107 So the Greens 
think the IIA is not the correct legal basis for the Register and recommends to create 
legislation through the normal legislative procedure. The CDA, a Dutch Christian-
Democratic Party, also agrees with the Greens in committing to a mandatory register.108 
What we now know 
In this chapter, multiple parties have been researched to map the opinions of professionals 
working with and researchers studying the Transparency Register. Every party had some 
concerns with the Transparency Register and had recommendations for new regulation of 
legislation. There were four main issues that most of the researched parties had an opinion 
on. In this conclusion, these four concerns will be discussed in this conclusion and the 
opinion of the professionals will be explained. The opinions of the professionals will also be 
schematically shown in a table. 
Voluntary or mandatory  
Almost all parties concluded that the register will not be fully functional if the register is not 
mandatory, but voluntary. There are still key players that haven’t registered, which makes 
register less meaningful and less functional. For example, ALTER-EU explained that some 
key players, like important groups from the financial world, have failed to register. The fact 
that some of the most important players in the EU are not registered and the voluntary aspect 
of the register is one of the main weaknesses according to the professionals. CEO is part of 
                                                          
106 The Greens/EFA, Modification of the Interinstitutional Agreement on the Transparency Register, retrieved 
from http://www.greens2014.eu/en/rights-democracy/introduction/modification-of-the-interinstitutional-
agreement-on-the-transparency-register.html on 30-05-2015 
107 The Greens/EFA, ‘Lobbying transparency rules’, retrieved from http://www.greens-efa.eu/lobbying-
transparency-rules-12259.html on 30-05-2015 
108 Written reaction by the CDA delegation in the European Parliament, 22-06-2015 
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ALTER-EU and has the same opinion. They also think that lobbyists don’t take the register 
seriously enough. These unregistered lobbyists might register when the register is fully 
mandatory. VNO-NCW doesn’t necessarily need the register to be mandatory, but doesn’t 
mind if it would be. However, if it were to be mandatory, the register has to be fair, stable 
and actually functional. SEAP does not believe in a mandatory register. They believe in the 
self-regulation of the profession and that obligating lobbyists is not the right way to make 
practices more transparent. However, most parties think the register should be mandatory in 
the future. The next schedule shows the opinion of professional of making the register 
mandatory or for it to remain voluntary in the future. 
Professional Voluntary/Mandatory? 
ALTER-EU Mandatory 
Corporate Europe Observatory Mandatory 
EPACA Mandatory 
SEAP Voluntary 
VNO-NCW Agrees with both 
The European Ombudsman Mandatory 
Transparency International Mandatory 
 
The information in the register 
Some parties are concerned with the quality of the information in the register. They have 
stated that the information in the register is sometimes dishonest or just simply inaccurate or 
outdated. For example, the budgets that are registered for lobbying are not realistic. The 
Secretariat of the register is supposed to check the information in the budget. Because it 
doesn’t have the resources and because it’s not independent, it’s not possible to check all 
entries. However, not all the incorrect information in the register is intentional. The exact 
budget for lobbying is difficult to pinpoint for companies or other organisations. The 
information could also be sensitive in competition between companies. The information in 
the register could give the competition important insight in the other company’s business. 
This could cause a distortion in the competition in the EU. The opinions on information in the 
register is also be schematically shown. 
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Professional Opinion on information 
ALTER-EU Information in register is unreliable. 
Secretariat doesn’t check the information  
sufficiently enough. 
Corporate Europe Observatory The incorrect data in the register is a 
weakness. 
EPACA Some information in the register is not 
necessary for more transparency and is too 
sensitive for competition. 
SEAP Not specified 
VNO-NCW It is difficult for companies to disclose some 
of the information. Information could distort 
competition. 
The European Ombudsman The Transparency Register doesn’t give the 
full picture of lobbying. The Ombudsman 
receives a lot of complaints about incorrect 
information 
Transparency International The register is weakly monitored and the 
Secretariat is not independent. 
 
Including the Council in the register 
Most parties saw a need to include the Council in the Transparency Register for it to be fully 
functional. Because the Council exclude themselves from the regulations on lobbying, it is 
still possible to lobby in the EU without registering. The degree of how important this issue 
was for the researched parties vary. Some parties think this issue is very important and 
lobbying will never be transparent without the Council joining the Register. VNO-NCW also 
thinks the Council should be included in the Register, but this is more from a functional 
perspective. They argue that it would be less of an administrative burden for lobbyist if the 
procedure was the same for every institution. EPACA is also in favour of including the 
Council in the Transparency Register. However, they are more pessimistic about the effect 
that it would have. Because the members of the Council are ministers from the member 
states, the lobbying takes place in the member states. Including the Council in the register 
would only mean including the Council administration, and EPACA does not think that the 
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administration is where the lobbying happens. Therefore, they think the effect of including 
the Council in the Transparency Register will not make that much of an impact. So even 
though the ideas on including the Council in the register may be different, most parties are, at 
least mildly, positive about including the Council. 
Professional Including the Council? 
ALTER-EU Not specified 
Corporate Europe Observatory Not specified 
EPACA Yes, but it will not have a great impact. 
SEAP Yes, it would be the first step to deal with the 
harmonisation problem. 
VNO-NCW Yes, it would mean less administrative burden. 
The European Ombudsman Yes 
Transparency International Yes 
 
IIA 
One of the main issues discussed in this thesis, is the question if an IIA is the right legal basis 
for the Transparency Register. This is also an issue that most of the researched parties have 
raised. According to for example ALTER-EU, an IIA is not the correct legal basis for the 
Transparency Register, because an IIA is only binding to the institutions that agreed on the 
IIA. So, if the new Commission proposal is still an IIA, sanctioning lobbyists when they 
breach the code of the register is not possible. The only option would be, what they’re doing 
now already, to delete these lobbyists from the register. EPACA would also prefer creating 
legislation over another IIA. However, they don’t think that that will happen anytime soon. 
They still think that a lot can be dealt with in an IIA, like making the register mandatory. 
When looking at the descriptions of the different parties, it is possible to conclude that almost 
all parties believe that the Transparency Register should be legislation, and not just an IIA, 
which raised the question why the Commission proposed to create a new IIA in the first 
place, and not started working on proposing legislation.  
Professional IIA or legislation? 
ALTER-EU Legislation 
Corporate Europe Observatory Legislation 
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EPACA Legislation, but doesn’t see that happening 
anytime soon 
SEAP Not specified 
VNO-NCW Not specified 
The European Ombudsman Yes 
Transparency International Yes 
 
Looking back at the conclusion of the researched parties in the register, the opinions about 
the register are pretty similar between all the parties. Most parties think the register should be 
mandatory and that the information in the register should be of a better quality. The 
information should also be functional to the purpose it aims at, to ensure transparent 
lobbying. This information should not distort competition. Also, the Secretariat should check 
the information in the register more. The Council should be included in the register and the 
legal basis of the register should not be an IIA, but it should be real legislation, created 
through the normal legislative procedure. The fact that almost all parties agree on what the 
weaknesses of the Transparency Register are and also mainly agree on what needs to be done 
to deal with these weaknesses, raised the question why these changes haven’t been 
implemented yet. Simply said, if it is clear what the problem is and if it is also clear what the 
solutions to the problem are, why hasn’t the issue been dealt with? 
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4. Final conclusion and recommendations 
 
In this thesis, the Transparency Register of the European Parliament and the European 
Commission has been studied and it has been explained how this register works. The second 
part of this thesis researched the opinions of different actors that work with the register or 
who have researched it. In this part of the thesis, this will shortly be concluded and explained. 
Then, this conclusion will move on to the opinions of the professionals and explain what the 
outcomes of the general opinions are. Finally, this thesis will end with recommendations to 
the Commission. 
The EU has become more and more interesting for lobbyists over the years. That is why the 
necessity of regulating lobbying became more and more clear to the European institutions. 
After attempts to separately regulate lobbying, the European Parliament and the European 
Commission created an Inter-Institutional Agreement in 2011, that established the Joint 
Transparency Register of the European Commission and the European Parliament. 
This register is voluntary, and all organisations or individuals that directly or indirectly try to 
influence the policy making process can register. Part of registering, is accepting the 
accompanying Code of Conduct. However, scientists have found some weaknesses to the 
register. The voluntary aspect of the register is one of the main weaknesses according to 
scientists, because those who choose to not register, are not monitored in any way. The 
register also doesn’t deal with some transparency issues, like the issue that European 
politicians and institutions are biased towards corporate lobbyist. Even though it has been 
questioned whether this is an issue or not, it should be mentioned and the possibility of this 
problem should be dealt with by the European institutions. The register is not the right tool 
for this. 
The European Commission also agrees that the Transparency Register has some weaknesses. 
The first changes to the register were made in January 2015, lobbyists or other registrants 
now have to disclose more information, like the exact budget they have for lobbying. The 
Commission has also committed to only meet with registered lobbyists. But the Commission 
is planning to further regulate lobbying. Juncker has expressed the will to make a new Inter-
Institutional Agreement, that would also include the Council. However, it is questioned if an 
IIA is the most suitable legal basis for the regulation of lobbying.  
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In the second part of this thesis, the opinions of professionals and researchers that work with 
the Transparency Register have been mapped. Seven groups from different backgrounds and 
with different occupations have been looked at. Three subjects per group have been 
discussed. The first is the description of the organisation and their opinion on transparency. 
The second is their opinion on the current Transparency Register and finally their ideas and 
recommendations for further regulating lobbyists. 
Like the scientists, the professionals are not fully satisfied with the current Transparency 
Register. Most parties think the Transparency Register is not a sufficient method to regulate 
lobbying in the EU and all parties have issues with the current register. However,  some 
parties do think the register is a step in the right direction.   
So, to answer the research question from this thesis:  
Is the Transparency Register a sufficient method to regulate lobbying in the EU or should the 
EU create further legislation, and if so; what form should the further legislation/regulation 
be? 
The answer to the first part of the question is that, in this form, the Transparency Register is 
not a sufficient method to regulate lobbying in the EU. Because the register is voluntary, 
lobbyists don’t register, which creates an uneven playing field. Also, some lobbyists that do 
register, do so under false pretences with incorrect or even made up information. The 
Secretariat of the register is responsible for checking the information, but they don’t have the 
resources to sufficiently do so. Another weakness that makes the Transparency Register an 
insufficient method, is that the Council is not included. Lobbying at the Council 
administration is still possible without registering.  
The second part of the research question will be answered in the form of recommendations to 
the Commission 
Recommendations 
There are some recommendations to the Commission for changing the Transparency 
Register.  
- Mandatory 
As stated before, because the register is voluntary and some lobbyists do register while others 
don’t, the playing field for lobbyists is uneven. Also, because lobbying without registering is 
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still possible, some parties don’t take the Transparency Register seriously. For the 
Transparency Register to be functional, the register should be fully mandatory and it should 
not be possible to meet with MEPs, Commissioners and with their staff without being 
registered to the Transparency Register. However, if the register were to be fully mandatory, 
it is important that the rules are crystal clear, like EPACA stated. It should be clear who has 
to register and what the rules are they need to keep. It has to be clear what should and what 
doesn’t need to be registered. Only when this is clear, a mandatory register could be 
manageable and successful.  
- Strengthening Transparency Register Secretariat 
The information in the register now is seen as unreliable and often as untruthful. For the 
register to work, the information in it has to be truthful. Someone should be able to consult 
the register and after that be sure about which party they are about to meet. To make this 
possible, the Transparency Register Secretariat should have more power and, as the European 
Ombudsman said, should be given more teeth. The Secretariat needs more manpower and 
more resources. This would ask a commitment from the European Parliament and the 
Commission, because more resources also means investing more. However, it is necessary to 
make this investment for the Transparency Register to become more effective. 
- Discrete with information 
It is important that the information in the register is the truth and that the information is 
extensive and broad to give a good insight in what the lobbyists are actually doing. However, 
it is also important that the information does not reveal too much about a company. The 
information that is in the register, should only be in it to make the process more transparent. 
Any further information is irrelevant and could even damage the free competition in the EU. 
It is important that the Commission asks herself if the information really contributes to 
transparency. If not, it should not be a part of the register. If a company’s sensitive 
information does contribute to more transparency, it should be considered to be more 
discrete. For example, to not directly publish the information on the internet, but to send it to 
parties who ask for it at the Secretariat. Then, the information is still open, but there is one 
step in between to not make it too easy for competition to get to know everything about their 
competitors. 
- Legislation instead of an IIA 
Rebecca Honing                                                                                                                  s1599623 
 
42 
 
Because an IIA is only binding for the institutions that agreed to it, lobbyists are not bound by 
anything if the Transparency Register is based on an IIA. Sanctioning lobbyists who don’t 
comply with the rules, could be useful. However, it could be argued that if the register is truly 
mandatory, excluding someone from the register could be a tough enough sanction. If the 
Commission does think that sanctioning is necessary, the legal basis of the Transparency 
Register should not be an IIA, but they should create legislation through the normal 
legislative procedure.  
- Council should be a part of the Register 
The Council is still not participating in the Transparency Register and therefore, lobbying 
them is possible without registering. As brought up by EPACA, the lobbying might not really 
be going on there, because the Council is made up from politicians from the member states, 
but it would still be an important step to include the Council administration. This would also 
be useful for companies and lobbyists. For them, it is desirable if there is harmonisation. That 
would make it easier, because it would be a small administrative burden if there is one 
process for all institutions. 
But maybe the most important thing that has to change before any regulation of lobbyists can 
ever be successful, is the will of the EU institutions to actually deal with the Transparency 
Register. Secretive lobbying will always be possible, even if the Transparency Register is 
fully mandatory, as long as politicians and staff let it happen. If there is a political will to deal 
with this issue and to also invest resources and manpower, lobbying in the EU could soon be 
more transparent. 
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